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ABSTRACT
I offer theoretical and empirical observations on the oversight of public sector employees. I argue
that it is unreasonable to expect that the solutions typically considered in the literature will be effective
with public sector employees, because bureaucrats are especially difficult to monitor. To offset this
weakness, agencies tend to hire bureaucrats who are biased against consumers, where such bias increases
incentives. I then address how bureaucrats should be overseen and offer a choice between internal
monitoring of public agencies, with overseers who are biased against consumers, or external monitoring,
where bureaucrats become excessively worried about the prospect of an investigation and may change
their behavior to attain that goal. I provide evidence from the Los Angeles Police Department to show
that officers appear to have responded to increased oversight by reducing crime-fighting activities in an
attempt to avoid investigation.
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Concerns about the behavior of public sector employees are widespread. Accusations of malfeasance
include the use of excessive force by police oﬃcers, immigration oﬃcials making decisions based on
nationality rather than merit1, the indiﬀerence of the Internal Revenue Service employees towards
their clients, and so on. Yet despite these concerns, little work has been done in economics on
how public sector agencies should be monitored.2 An important topical issue concerns the role
of external parties in overseeing public agencies. Much oversight in the public sector is internal,
where for example the performance of a police oﬃcer is evaluated by a superior. Yet external
constituencies, such as the media and congress, have become increasingly involved in evaluating
performance. Two well known examples are (i) the 1997 congressional hearings on the way that IRS
oﬃcials treat tax payers, that (among other things) resulted in the creation of the Internal Revenue
Service Oversight Board, and (ii) the media attention on the Los Angeles Police Department that
has ultimately resulted in almost 10% of all oﬃcers being discipined in the last three years. This
paper addresses the role of internal and external oversight for the kind of activities typically carried
out in the public sector.
One feature that seems to characterize government agencies is a lack of trust in their willingness
to credibly investigate the actions of their employees.3 I argue that this occurs partly because their
employees have diﬀerent preferences to the population whose objectives they implement. These
diﬀerences in preferences make them more eﬀective when dealing with clients but tend to make
them poor overseers. For example, I show that there is a value to choosing police oﬃcers who
see the claims of innocence by suspects as less important than does the average member of the
population. While this helps to catch criminals, genuine claims of innocence tend to fall on deaf
ears.
External monitoring, if based on public opinion, is less likely to suﬀer from such bias. Yet
outsiders tend to be poorly informed. As I have argued in Prendergast, 2001, their attention is
1See New York Times, 2000, and Hall, 2001, for examples.
2It is well known that the kinds of pay-for-performance contracts used in the private sector are unlikely to be
eﬀective in the public sector, mainly for multi-tasking reasons (Dixit, 2001). But this still leaves open the issue of
how oversight should be done.
3An obvious example is the perceived reluctance of police departments to investigate wrongdoing by their oﬃcers
(for example, www.policeabuse.org), heightened by a reluctance of oﬃcers to report on each other, known as the “Thin
Blue Line”. Yet the police are hardly alone in this: one of the primary reasons for the proliferation of malpractice
suits in the medical profession is the historical resistance of hospitals to eﬀectively monitor doctors. Similarly, the
INS and IRS are hardly known for taking the side of consumers in interactions with their oﬃcials. This is not to say
that private sector ﬁrms can be always trusted to rely on internal monitoring. For instance, the media and courts
have played an important role in the many cases of auto defects and drug problems, such as with Thalidomide in the
1950s.
1often piqued only when there is evidence that a mistake has happened. This typically comes from a
disgruntled consumer; a suspect incorrectly arrested, a patient wrongly turned down for a medical
procedure, a legitimate immigrant turned down at the border. But if consumers play this role of
pointing out mistakes, oﬃcials may simply accede to the demands of consumers, even when not
warranted, to avoid complaints.4 As a result, the paper oﬀers a choice between internal monitoring
of public agencies, with potentially biased overseers, or external monitoring, where bureaucrats
may ineﬃciently allocate beneﬁts to avoid investigation. I also provide empirical evidence on the
Los Angeles Police Department which suggests that increased external oversight has caused oﬃcers
to ineﬃciently avoid situations that could lead them into trouble.
It is worth emphasizing that I do not address whether an activity should be carried out in the
private or public sector: this is not a theory of ownership. Instead, my objective is to understand
oversight when (i) consumer complaints are used to monitor employees, and (ii) consumers beneﬁt
from some ineﬃcient allocations. I argue below that many public sector activities satisfy these
criteria. I make no claim that the problems below arise because they are done in the public sector,
nor that there are not some private sector examples. Instead, these problems arise in the public
sector only because they often satisfy these two criteria.
I begin in Section 2 by arguing that oversight for many public sector activities is especially
diﬃcult because signals on performance are typically unreliable. A key issue in solving many agency
problems is whether consumers, the primary source of information on performance, are willing to
point out employee incompetence. Because many goods allocated by the public sector are beneﬁts
(citizenship, unemployment insurance, etc.), their consumers can have very diﬀerent incentives to
overseers and are unwilling to point out known errors. For example, guilty suspects have no reason
to point out a police oﬃcer’s error by not arresting him, nor do unqualiﬁed immigrants own up
when incorrectly allowed into the country.
I show that the ensuing weakness of contracts to solve public sector agency problems has
important implications for the selection of bureaucrats. A feature of many goods allocated by
the public sector is that people disagree over their importance. For example, some see income
support programs as an important crutch for the poor, while others see them as little more than
an institutionalized mechanism to avoid work. Equally, there is disagreement over how the police
should be allowed to investigate a crime, such as the conditions under which searches should be
allowed. Some people are more concerned with catching criminals, whereas others worry more
4For instance, a police oﬃcer could avoid confrontations and reduce arrests, the IRS could cut down on auditing
diﬃcult cases which could land the oﬃcial in trouble, and the INS could allow unqualiﬁed applicants to enter the
country.
2about the privacy rights of citizens. I consider where bureaucrats should lie on this dimension:
should they have the preferences of the average member of the population, or should society hire
biased bureaucrats?5
I provide a reason why bureaucrats should have biased preferences, where they see the claims
of consumers as less important than does society. The bias improves their incentives to make
good decisions. As with other members of society, bureaucrats care about appropriately allocating
treatments to clients; doctors care about curing patients, police oﬃcers care about controlling crime,
immigration oﬃcial are concerned with denying access to the unqualiﬁed, and so on.6 Consider
then the decision to hire one of two police oﬃcers: one who is largely concerned with avoiding the
innocent being convicted, and another who worries most about the loss from letting the guility
go free. There is one central diﬀerence between these two cases. Speciﬁcally, there are many
mechanisms in place to correct outcomes where the innocent are arrested, such as complaints,
trials, appeals, and so on. These mechanisms reduces the ultimate likelihood of the innocent being
convicted. But the knowledge that their mistakes will be corrected reduces incentives, as an oﬃcer
is partly motivated by the desire to avoid mistakes. By contrast, an oﬃcer who mistakenly releases
the guility can expect little likelihood of this being brought to light, as the suspect has nothing to
gain from pointing out the error. Then an oﬃcer who is particularly concerned with the guility
being set free becomes more useful, as she has greater incentives to ﬁnd appropriate evidence on
the client. Thus, more generally bureaucrats will be disproportionately selected from those who
are sceptical of the demands of consumers.
Given this tendency to select biased bureaucrats, I then consider their oversight; internal moni-
toring is addressed in Section 3. Insiders typically know more than do those who are more removed
from the proceedings, especially about routine cases. This allow overseers to reward employees for
taking hard decisions, rather than only responding when a mistake occurrs. But internal monitor-
ing decisions largely reﬂect the preferences of insiders: for instance, they rely on the willingness of
co-workers to report errors. Bureaucratic bias then becomes a problem, as oversight is not targeted
in the way that society would like: because bureaucrats are, on average, biased against consumers,
there is too little responsiveness to the legitimate concerns of denied consumers, and too much
intervention when consumers are allocated beneﬁts. In eﬀect, the characteristics that make for
good bureaucrats also make for poor overseers.
5Selection concerns are well known in economics, and the role of contracts in (for example) attracting more able
workers has become part of the lexicon of agency theory. I do not consider selection in this usual sense of getting
talented workers: instead I am more interested in the role of biased evaluators.
6This “professionalism” of bureaucrats repeatedly arises in discussions of public sector agencies, such as Wilson,
1989.
3This leads to a role for external monitoring, considered in Section 4, which has the advantage
that external monitors do not exhibit the bias that characterizes internal monitoring. But as in
Prendergast, 2001, external monitors are typically less informed than are their internal counterparts,
and their attention tends to be focused the actions of spurned consumers. It is usually the case
where the drug-dealing suspect was incorrectly arrested or beaten up that brings attention, not
the case where the drug-dealer was incorrectly set free.7 Investigations by external evaluators
tend to be focused not on all cases where the bureaucrat erred, but where she erred and harmed a
consumer. Consequently, bureaucrats are often faced with the temptation to largely avoid oversight
by capitulating to consumers. The problem with external monitoring is that it becomes diﬃcult to
induce bureaucrats to deny beneﬁts to consumers. The paper therefore oﬀers a cautionary tale for
increasing external oversight (such as the “zero-tolerance” programs of some police departments)
as the incentive to simply give consumers what they want becomes too tempting.
Section 5 provides empirical evidence on the particular diﬃculty of monitoring police oﬃcers,
by providing time series data on the Los Angeles Police Department. I provide evidence that is
consistent with oﬃcers responding to increased oversight by being less likely to harm consumers,
in this case suspects, as doing so is now more likely to result in disciplinary measures. Speciﬁcally,
I show that after an increase in oversight in 1998, oﬃcers have been more reluctant to engage
in “aggressive” policing on a variey of dimensions such as use-of-force, oﬃcer-involved shootings,
assaults on oﬃcers, and arrest rates. This change in behavior is also correlated with a large recent
increase in gang crime.
Section 6 considers some extensions. Foremost among these is to consider why these problems
only arise for activities where consumers are known to beneﬁt from particular allocations, even
when they do not deserve them. To take an example, consider a patient who may qualify for a
costly procedure that can improve his health. If the patient does not pay for the procedure, the
patient always wants the procedure, and the problems described above arise. If, by contrast, the
patient is required to pay for the procedure, I show that the payment of prices can make consumer
feedback more credible, which eliminates the need to bias the selection of agents. As a result, it
is the nature of the goods allocated, namely, that they are beneﬁts, that induces the selection and
agency issues that are the focus of the paper.
Before beginning, it is worth emphasizing that this paper is not meant to justify oversight
diﬃculties for all public sector employees. As discussed in Dixit, 2001, there many reasons why
oversight is diﬃcult in the public sector. Instead, the contribution of this paper is restricted to those
7While the police department itself may be criticized for its inability to control crime, this rarely reaches the
individual oﬃcer.
4cases where (i) a bureaucrat allocates beneﬁts to a consumer, and (ii) feedback from the consumer
reveals information on her performance. This would include many oﬃcials of institutions like the
IRS, INS, and Department of Motor Vehicles, in addition to police oﬃcers, but this paper has little
to say about the canonical “faceless” bureaucrat whose performance is never directly observed by
consumers.
2 The Basic Model
An allocation A must be made to a consumer, where A can take on a value of 0 or 1. An allocation
of 1 is beneﬁcial to the consumer: for concrete purposes, think of a = 0 as arresting a suspect and
a = 1 as freeing him. Society, which consists of M (interested) individuals, values the allocation
based on a characteristic of the consumer. Average per capita social surplus from the allocation







1 if A = α,
0 otherwise.
(1)
Thus social surplus is positive only if A is properly matched to the underlying environment, α:
so for example a suspect should only be arrested if there is a reasonable belief that the person is
guilty. The true value of α is unknown and can take two values α = 1, or α = 0. I assume that
each state occurs with equal probability.
Information There are three actors in this model: society (the principal), an agent (or bureau-
crat), and a consumer. The agent is used to propose an allocation to the consumer. To do so,
she collects information on α; she observes αa which is correct with probability q ≥ 1
2, where with
probability 1 − q, she observes αa 6= α. The precision of the agent’s estimate depends on an un-
observed eﬀort decision by her, where she chooses eﬀort e ≥ 0 at a disutility of e. Let q(e) be the
precision of the agent’s estimate, where q(0) ≥ 1
2, q0(e) > 0, q00(e) ≤ 0, and q(∞) < 1.
Second, the consumer observes α. Let V (A,α) be the utility obtained by the consumer if his
type is truly α and the allocation is A. I assume that the consumer has diﬀerent preferences to
society as
V (1,α) > V (0,α). (2)
Thus, the consumer wishes to receive the beneﬁt (a = 1) independent of his type, so his preferences
are not aligned with those of society.
5Somebody is charged with overseeing the agent: this choice is made by the principal. The
overseer is uninformed unless he carries out an investigation. To model a role for investigations,
I assume that the overseer chooses a probability of observing α at some cost.8 Speciﬁcally, the
overseer chooses a probability ρ with which he observes α, at a per capita cost κ(ρ), where κ0(ρ) >
0,κ00(ρ) > 0,κ0(0) = 0,κ(0) = 0, and κ0(1) ≥ 1. For simplicity, throughout the paper I assume that
monitoring costs are quadratic: κ(ρ) =
γρ2
2 , where γ ≥ 1. At this stage, the identity of the overseer
remains vague, and depends on whether monitoring is internal or external, as described below.
Heterogeneity Average social surplus in (1) is made up of the diﬀerent preferences of individuals
in society. The idiosynchratic preference of person i is given by vi, and measures the extent to which





As mentioned in the introduction, my interest is in how bureaucrats weigh one error (where
A 6= α) relative to another: for example, how bothered are they by a qualiﬁed applicant being denied
compared to an unqualiﬁed applicant being accepted? This is measured by vi. To understand the
import of these preferences, consider the cost of misallocating A to α. For person i, the cost of
misallocating the beneﬁt to the agent (A = 1) is 1 − vi, while the cost of incorrectly failing to
allocate it (A = 0) is 1 + vi. Thus, vi measures the extent to which a person values one error over
another. Thus, in the law enforcement example, lower vi types are less worried about the innocent
being convicted than are higher vi individuals individuals. For simplicity, I assume that vi can take
two values: v with probability z and v with probability 1−z, where zv +(1−z)v = 0. Reservation
utilities are independent of v.
Actions and Contracts The bureaucrat has two actions: (i) an eﬀort level, e(v), and (ii) an
allocation to give the consumer, a(v). Based on this allocation the consumer sends a message
m ∈ {n,c}, where the message n means that no complaint is made and message c implies that a
complaint has been made.
The principal (society) has three choices. First, he employs N employees, where he chooses a
8I assume that the signal received by him is correct with probability 1. This assumption is used to rule out
“nuisance complaints”, where a customer complains even when he knows that the bureaucrat made the right decision
in the hope that the principal will come to the wrong conclusion and overturn the bureaucrat’s decision in the
consumer’s interest. I am largely interested here in cases where complaints are informative of bureaucratic error and
so ignore this possibility by assuming that the principal never makes errors after an investigation.
6fraction µ of v types and 1 − µ of v types. The choice of µ is unobserved by the agents.9 N is
assumed small relative to the population. Second, he chooses oversight of the bureaucrat, where
oversight is either internal or external. If monitoring is external, the principal himself oversees. If
monitoring is internal, the employees choose monitoring levels to maximize their expected utility.10
The party charged with overseeing the agent chooses to investigate the performance of the agent
with probability ρ(a,m), where monitoring potentially depends both on whether the customer
complains and on the allocation made by the bureaucrat. The overseer cannot commit to oversight
probabilities.
I assume that insiders have a comparative advantage in observing the details of cases over
external parties. Speciﬁcally,
• Internal parties can observe both the allocation proposed by the bureaucrat a and the response
by the consumers m.
• External parties only observe whether a consumer complains. As a result, if the consumer
does not complain they do not observe the allocation proposed by the agent.
This assumption is meant to reﬂect the fact that outsider typically do not observe much about
routine cases, but instead have their attention piqued by consumers. For example, the media
typically knows little about the details of eﬃcient drug arrests. I discuss this assumption in Section
6.
If an investigation turns up evidence that the agent made a mistake, the overseer overturns the
agent’s decision and allocates the correct one. If the investigation concurs with the agent’s ﬁndings,
or there is no investigation, the decision remains that suggested by the agent.
Preferences The objective of society is to maximize per capita surplus: S
M from the allocation,
minus investigation costs κ(ρ(.,.)) minus the eﬀort costs of the agent ( e
M). No contracts can be
oﬀered to the consumer, whose objective is to maximize V minus a cost of complaints.
The preferences of the agent are a little more complex. Her preferences diﬀer from the pop-
ulation’s in two ways. First, as is standard, she is eﬀort averse. Second, she has idiosynchratic
preferences given by vi. I further assume that there are monetary consequences to her actions,
where she is rewarded for making correct decisions and penalized for poor decisions. Incentives
9It seems unlikely that agents would observe the preferences of all members of the bureaucracy. I discuss the eﬀect
of relaxing this assumption in Appendix 3.
10The results are identical if one employee is randomly selected to oversee.
7are provided by career concerns.11 Assume that bureaucrats diﬀer in their ability, where ability
is unknown to all parties. Bureaucrats are of two types; those who are always right, and those
who are always wrong.12 The fraction of agents who are always right is given by q(e).13 The
bureaucrat’s wage depends on perceptions of her ability held by the overseeing agency, and is given




− κ(ρ(.,.)) + viA − e + E[q(e)|Ω]∆, (4)
The ﬁrst two terms are simply the average valuation of the population for the allocation and
investigation costs. The vi term reﬂects the personal preferences of the agents, and e is the (fully
internalized) cost of the agent.
∆ is exogenous, and reﬂects the marginal return to ability. In keeping with much of the literature
on bureaucrats, such as Wilson, 1989, I assume that such incentives are weak, in that eﬀort is below
its ﬁrst best optimal level. As a result, improvements in monitoring which increase incentives to
exert eﬀort will also increase surplus.14 This will be the case when M is large enough (see footnote
20).
The timing of the game is as follows. First, society hires agents and decides who should oversee
them. Second, nature assigns α to the consumer and the agent exerts eﬀort. Third, the customer
and the agent privately observe their signals. Next, the agent proposes an allocation a. Following
this, the customer send a message m, i.e., he complains or not. The overseer observes the relevant
information and then monitors with probability ρ(a,m) to maximize his utility at that point. If he
observes α, he allocates A = α. Otherwise, the agent’s recommendation is implemented. Finally,
the agent is paid.
A Role For Complaints I am interested in cases where complaints are informative of bureaucrat
error and, hence, increase the likelihood of oversight. To do this, I assume that the consumer has
11It is generally accepted that pay-for-performance contracts play a very limited role with public sector bureaucrats
(see Dixit, 2000, Dewatripont et al., 1999, and Prendergast, 1999, for relevant examples), and that instead incentives
for public sector employees are provided by career advancement induced by impressions of their ability. Consequently,
incentives in this model are provided through career concerns.
12The model easily generalizes to less extreme types.
13Thus, the return to eﬀort is to increase the fraction of agents who make correct decisions. This assumption is
a little diﬀerent from the standard career concerns model, such as Holmstrom, 1982, where ability is independent
of eﬀort. For example, it would be possible to specify the probability of being correct as, say, q(ability,e) where
the overseer infers ability from whether the agent was correct or not. In the usual way, agents have incentives to
exert eﬀort even though in equilibrium, such eﬀorts are futile. It would be straightforward to use this form of career
concerns without changing results: it is purely for simplicity that I use this form.
14This would typically be the case whenever there is a marginal cost to using wages as the mechanism of providing
incentives, where that marginal cost of incentive provision is traded oﬀ against its beneﬁts. This assumption is made
merely to illustrate the increased surplus that is likely to arise from improving private beneﬁts to exert eﬀort.
8an arbitrarily small cost of complaining: as the principal observes α upon investigation, consumers
never complain when the bureaucrat makes the correct decision. The only issue is whether they
complain when an error has been made. Although the model is not (quite) cheap talk, there is
a multiplicy of equilibria based on how language (the message) is interpreted. To eliminate this,
I assume that messages are meant literally, in the sense that a complaint strictly increases the
probability of investigation.
Limited Private Beneﬁts I show below that there is a role for hiring biased agents, as this
improves their incentives for exerting eﬀort. But if agents are very biased - v too large - they will
make ineﬃcient allocations simply because the private beneﬁts from doing so are so large. For
example, if a police oﬃcer values arrests so much that he arrests people he believes to be innocent,
the advantages described below disappear. As a result, for the bias to play an eﬃcient role, it
needs to be of limited size that private beneﬁts do not exceed the value of their beliefs. A suﬃcient
condition for this is given by (5) which implies that v is low relative to the value of their information.
This assumption is discussed in detail in Section 6.
|v| ≤
(1 − q(0))(1 − ρ(1,n)) − q(0)(1 − ρ(0,c))
q(0)(1 − ρ(0,c)) + (1 − q(0))(1 − ρ(1,n))
(5)
Finally, the model is only interesting if the agents aﬀect the allocation. This arises when agents
recommend αa. But for poorly informed agents, a better allocation is simply to always deny the
consumer, and to allow only the consumer’s complaints to aﬀect the allocation. For low enough q,
this is a better allocation mechanism than giving the bureaucrat the power to allocate the good.
Throughout the paper, I assume that q(0) is high enough that the agent is given the power to
allocate the good.15
I consider pure strategy Bayesian Nash equilibria of the model where (i) the agent allocates
αa = a (if such an equilibrium exists), (ii) ρ(.,c) > ρ(.,n)16, (iii) (5) holds, and one technical
assumption, (iv) that the agent does not update beliefs on µ from the decision of the principal to
hire her.17 To ﬁnd such equilibria, there are four important incentives to consider.




2 . For q(0)
large enough, this is always dominated by allowing the agent to report truthfully. By contrast, consider the case
where q =
1
2 for all e. Then straightforward calculations show that the surplus from always denying the consumer is
3
4, while allowing the agent to make an allocation of a = αa yields surplus of
5
8. As a result, I need to assume that
there is a substantive role for the agent.
16This rules out the usual babbling equilibrium.
17I assume that the agent does not update on µ from the decision of the principal to hire her. Instead, the agent
infers µ only by using Bayes Law from the equilibrium strategies below. This assumption rules out corner solutions
where the principal in equilibrium hires none of a particular type of worker, which is enforced by the out-of-equilibrium
92.1 Incentives
The Incentive to Complain If a complaint increases the probability of an investigation, the
consumer complains only if an error has been made and he has been denied the good a = 0. Consider
the outcome when a bureaucrat recommends allocation j but the consumer knows that allocation
i is socially optimal. If the agent complains, this increases the likelihood of i being ultimately
implemented. The agent will complain if the bureaucrat errs by allocating j if V (i,i) ≥ V (j,i),
where the small cost of complaint is ignored. To see this, note that a complaint is only relevant
if the principal monitors and corrects the decision to A = i. This occurs with probability ρ(a,c)
and changes utility by V (i,i) − V (i,j). If no complaint is made, the monitoring probability is
ρ(a,n). Thus the consumer can credibly reveal information on bureaucratic error only if (ρ(a,c)−
ρ(a,n))V (i,i) > (ρ(a,c) − ρ(a,n))V (i,j) for all i and j. But from (2), this only holds for a = 0 if
ρ(a,c) > ρ(a,n).18
Truth-Telling The agent proposes a based on her information, αa. Truth-telling requires that
the agent has an incentive to allocate a = αa.
Eﬀort The agent cares about both about the allocation and the monetary consequences of her
actions. She chooses eﬀort to maximize (4).
Oversight Finally, consider the incentive to monitor. This depends on who oversees the ﬁrm.
1. If oversight is external, society chooses monitoring probabilities to maximize ex post surplus.
Let τ(a,m;v) be the probability (as perceived by the overseer) that the agent of type v is
incorrect based on an allocation a and a message m sent by the consumer. Then the external





so that the optimal investigation probability is ρ∗(a,m;v) =
τ(a,m;v)
γ .19 [For notational con-
venience, I do not condition the choices below on v, but the assumption is implicit.]
belief that if any of the other type is hired, those types infer from that action that the principal is hiring in such a
suboptimal way that the principal prefers to hire none of that type. I rule this out by assuming that the decision to
hire a given worker does not change that worker’s beliefs about µ.
18To avoid the uninteresting problem of the out-of-equilibrium action where the customer complains when allocated
a = 1, assume that the principal always monitors in that case.
19I assume that γ is large enough to guarantee an interior solution: allowing corner solutions would not change the
results.
102. If oversight is internal, the preferences of the employees determine the probability of moni-
toring. Let µ be the fraction of v types in the ﬁrm. Then the internal monitor sets oversight
probabilities to maximize the average utility of the employees. For example, assume that the
agent recommends a = 0 and there is a probability of τ(0,m) that the allocation is incorrect.
Then the overseer chooses ρ∗(0,m) to maximize






τ(0,m)[µv + (1 − µ)v + 1]
γ
(8)
Only in the case where µ = z, where bureaucrats are chosen to be the population average,
does internal monitoring coincide with the preferences of society.
3 Internal Oversight
Begin by considering the case where the principal allows insiders to choose oversight probabilities.
Again consider each incentive in turn.
Oversight Simple calculations show that
ρ∗(0,c) =
1 + (µ − z)(v − v)
γ
, (9)
ρ∗(0,n) = 0, (10)
and
ρ∗(1,n) =
(1 − q)[1 + (z − µ)(v − v)]
γ
. (11)
Note how the preferences of the employees determine the incentive to investigate: more v employees
result in increased monitoring when the consumer is denied the beneﬁt (and complains), but reduce
its likelihood when allocated the asset.
Eﬀort The agent chooses e to maximize the sum of her private beneﬁts and her expected monetary
returns. Her expected monetary return potentially depends on the allocation made, whether a
complaint occurs, and on the outcome of the investigation. In any outcome where the agent reveals
the state truthfully, a complaint illustrates that she was incorrect (as the consumer only complains
when an error has been made). As a result, if the consumer complains, the agent earns 0. On the
11other hand, if there is no complaint when the agent allocates a = 0, the agent is correct and is paid
∆. The expected value of then reporting 0 is q(e)∆, the prior.
On the other hand, if the agent allocates a = 1 the consumer never complains. If the overseer
investigates, she earns an expected wage of q(e)∆. But no information is revealed on the agent
without an investigation, and so the agent earns q(Ee(v))∆, where Ee(v) is the expected eﬀort of
type v. Let ˆ ρ refer to the expected level of oversight.20 No investigation occurs with probability
1−ˆ ρ∗(1,n)
2 . Thus, if truth-telling holds the ex ante expected monetary reward is
q(e)∆
1 + ˆ ρ∗(1,n)
2
+ q(Ee(v))∆
1 − ˆ ρ∗(1,n)
2
The agent then exerts eﬀort to maximize
Ua(v) =












1 + ˆ ρ∗(1,n;v)
2
+ q(Ee(v))∆
1 − ˆ ρ∗(1,n)
2
− e. (12)
Note that the principal cannot directly aﬀect the eﬀort of any given agent: the eﬀect of the
principal’s actions on eﬀort exerted derives solely through who they hire (i.e., through µ). But
µ is not directly observed, so that eﬀort levels are based on expected oversight. This limits the
ability of the principal to aﬀect eﬀort choices.
Truth-telling The calculation above also implies that the truth-telling constraint is satisﬁed with
internal monitoring. This is because the overseer can condition wages on a. As a result, for any
allocation, learning is simply a mean preserving spread on expected ability if the agent reports
truthfully. If the agent reports truthfully, her expected wage in equilibrium is then q(e)∆ (because
in equilibrium e(v) = E(e(v))). By contrast, if she oﬀers an allocation diﬀerent from her true belief,
she earns [q(e) − (2q(e) − 1)ρ∗(1,n)]∆ < q(e)∆. Thus, there is a monetary cost to misallocating.
But there are also private beneﬁts to be considered. However, (5) guarantees that these are not
large enough to overcome the value of allocating correctly.
Lemma 1 Assume that (5) holds. Then truth-telling is always satisﬁed with internal monitoring.
20Expectations are required here as the agent must form a belief about µ.
123.1 Incentives and Selection
To understand the tradeoﬀs with internal monitoring, consider how v aﬀects incentives. Straight-
forward diﬀerentiation of (12) yields that eﬀort is characterized by
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∆q0(e)(1 + ˆ ρ∗(1,n))
2
= 1, (13)
where q00(.) < 0 guarantees that the second order condition holds. The ﬁnal term on the LHS
provides the monetary eﬀects of exerting eﬀort, and depends on ∆. The remaining terms reﬂect
the private returns to the agent from making the correct allocation. In order to understand how
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Put simply, hiring agents who are more sceptical of the value of allocating the asset to the agent
increases their incentives.21 The reason for this is that their mistakes of denial (a = 0) are corrected
with probability ρ∗(0,c), which at µ = z is given by 1
γ. When γ is low (close to 1) this implies
that there is little equilibrium likelihood of the consumer being denied this important beneﬁt. As a
result, bureaucrats have little incentive to exert eﬀort as they know that these errors will ultimately
be corrected. By contrast, at µ = z, ρ∗(1,n) equals
(1−q)
γ = (1 − q)ρ∗(0,c). Therefore there is a
higher likelihood of the agent being ineﬃciently given the asset ([1 − q(e)](1 − ρ∗(1,n))), as the
consumer does not point out these errors. This higher likelihood is gives the agent an incentive
to exert eﬀort. Therefore, bureaucrats exert eﬀort more to correct errors of giving the agent the
beneﬁt than to correct those of denial.
The reason for biased selection is then a short step. Since some agents care more about errors
of acceptance more than others (i.e., those who do not value the claims of consumers as much as
the population average), those individuals exert more eﬀort than people who are more concerned
with errors of denial. This induces the principal to bias the selection of bureaucrats. While
ρ(1,n;v) depends on v and can be used to partially oﬀset reductions in eﬀort, the costliness of this
21See Aghion and Tirole, 1997, for other work emphasizing how private beneﬁts can induce eﬀort exertion.
13intervention implies that surplus is increasing in e for eﬀort below the ﬁrst best level.22 Therefore,
those who are more sceptical of the demands of consumers realise that without their contribution,
consumers are quite likely to ineﬃciently end up with the allocation they prefer: as a result, they
exert more eﬀort in the (eﬃcient) task of denying them these beneﬁts.
3.2 The Principal’s Objective
The principal’s objective is to maximize social surplus subject to (i) the consumer’s incentive to
complain, (ii) the agent’s eﬀort incentives, (iii) the incentives to oversee given by (9), (10), and (11),
and (iv) the agent’s truth-telling constraint.23 Expected social surplus is given by the weighted
average of the productivity of the proportion µ who are type v and the complementary probability
that are type v. Let e be the eﬀort decision of type v and e be the eﬀort decision of type v. Then
expected surplus is24
µ[q(e) + (1 − q(e))ρ∗(0,c)]
2
+
(1 − µ)[q(e) + (1 − q(e))ρ∗(0,c))]
2
−
[1 − µq(e) − (1 − µ)q(e)]γρ∗(0,c)2
4
+
µ[q(e) + (1 − q(e))ρ∗(1,n;v)]
2
+





− (1 − µ)
γρ∗(1,n;v)2
4
− µe − (1 − µ)e. (16)
Surplus has a number of components. First, the surplus from the allocation arises both when
the agent makes the correct decision (the q(e) terms) and when her errors are corrected (the
22This result is based on the assumption that increasing eﬀort is beneﬁcial for the principal, i.e., that eﬀort is below
ﬁrst best. The ﬁrst best chooses eﬀort levels and oversight to maximize expected surplus given by










































For M large enough, ﬁrst best eﬀort always exceeds that privately chosen by the agent.
23Note that no individual rationality constraint is included here. This is already incorporated in the program of
maximizing surplus, as the reservation utilities of the two types of agents are identical. It is worth noting that the
required wage to employ a worker of type v is decreasing in the fraction of workers of the same type, as investigations
are more closely matched to their desires as v rise. But this beneﬁt is oﬀset by the loss to the other type of agents,
including those who do not work in the ﬁrm. As a result, the surplus maximization program includes this eﬀect.
24It is always optimal to choose ρ(0,n) = 0 so this is ignored here.
14(1 − q(e))ρ∗(.,.) terms). This applies to both types of agents (v and v) and to the cases where
a = 0 and a = 1 arise. Note that monitoring in the case where a = 1 is proposed are not focused
on the cases where mistakes happened, unlike the case where a = 0. Maximizing surplus subject
to (9), (10), (11), and the agent’s incentive constraint (13), yields Proposition 1. All proofs are in
the Appendix.
Proposition 1 Assume that at µ = z, the agents’ eﬀorts e are below the ﬁrst best level. Then if
the principal chooses internal monitoring, the optimal level of µ is less than z, i.e., bureaucrats are
on average biased against consumers.
Proposition 1 reﬂects the two conﬂicting eﬀects in operation when choosing bureaucracts. The
objective is to maximize societal surplus when overseeing. This leads to choosing µ = z to align
with the preferences of society. But agents who are sceptical of the consumer’s demands exert more
eﬀort. This eﬀects alone would lead to only choosing v agents. At µ = z, oversight losses are second
order, but the beneﬁt from replacing a v agent with a v agent is ﬁrst order, and so the principal
chooses the fraction of v types below z.
To summarize, this section oﬀers a theory of bureaucracies where bureaucrats are optimally
under-responsive to consumer complaints. This lack of (ex post) eﬃcient response arises because
they both exert eﬀort and play an oversight role. But these objectives are in conﬂict, because of the
key assumption that internal monitoring depends on the preferences of insiders. I ﬁnd it realistic
that most internal monitoring mechanisms reﬂect the preferences of the individuals in that setting,
so that (for example) a police force disproportionately made up of oﬃcers who are sceptical of claims
of innocence is unlikely to intervene in the way that society believes to be appropriate. From (9),
it can be readily seen that for µ < z, ρ∗(0,c) falls short of the level desired ex post by society (i.e.,
1
γ), while from (11) it follows that oﬃcers who release suspects will come under excessive scrutiny
(ρ∗(1,n) >
1−q
γ ). As a result, this section oﬀers a model of endogenously biased internal monitoring
caused by the poor signals received by superiors about the performance of agents, which themselves
derive from the unreliability of information from the consumers of beneﬁts.
4 External Monitoring
An alternative way of overseeing is to allow society to allow external parties to intervene, perhaps
through public opinion, congressional hearings, the courts, the media, and so on. These channels
can play an important role in aﬀecting policy and in disciplining many public sector employees.
For example, media attention focused on the Los Angeles Police Department was a key factor in
15its overhaul, so that now all consumer complaints must now be investigated by Internal Aﬀairs
(see Figure 1). Similarly, congressional oversight focused attention on the practices of the IRS,
which resulted in the Internal Revenue Service Restructuring and Reform Act of 1998, requiring
the creation of an independent Oversight Board to create a climate of accountability within the
IRS.25
External monitoring has an advantage over internal mechanisms in that it can intervene when
society sees ﬁt rather than relying on when bureaucrats see it as appropriate. But a cost of
external monitoring26, as in Prendergast, 2001, is that external parties are more reliant on signals of
wrongdoing before they intervene. Speciﬁcally, I show that external oversight exacerbates the truth-
telling condition above so that bureaucrats who face external monitoring can have the overarching
incentive to avoid investigation. This can lead to consumers being allocated beneﬁts when agents
believe that they do not deserve them. In eﬀect, the agent realises that by simply giving the good
to the consumer, he will not complain and so the agent is less likely to be penalized.
It is worth considering the diﬀerence between internal and external monitoring in the context
of this model. In the previous section, the internal monitor could observe the recommendations
of bureaucrats, and could (in equilibrium) condition wages on that recommendation. This implied
that, for example, a police oﬃcer who correctly arrested a suspect could be rewarded more than a
police oﬃcer who did not arrest a suspect but was not investigated. This distinction was important
for giving oﬃcers an incentive to arrest, and lead to the irrelevance of the truth-telling condition
above. But external monitors observe nothing about the details of cases unless the consumer
complains, and only by investigating do they get more details on the case. This implies that
bureaucrats are similarly rewarded if (without complaint or investigation) (i) they correctly arrested
a suspect, and (ii) they did not arrest the suspect. I show that this inability to distinguish may
imply that the consumer is given the beneﬁt, even when the agent believes that the consumer does
not deserve it. For example, consider the Internal Revenue Service. It has been argued that the
increased congressional oversight has resulted in “a sharp roll-oﬀ in tax investigations as auditors,
fearing for their bureaucratic lives, proceed timidly..[as]..tax collectors are too worried about their
jobs to be aggressive” (Star Tribune, 2000).
The objective of the principal is again to hire to maximize expected surplus subject to the same
constraints as above. Consider the relevant incentive constraints.
25For more details on the eﬀect of the Act on taxpayer rights, see www.henderco.com/1998act.html.
26One obvious drawback could be that the cost of investigation is higher for external parties. This will lead to
reduced incentives for bureaucrats for the obvious reason that it will reduce the likelihood of an investigation. I do
not address this straightforward cost of external oversight by assuming identical investigation costs.
16Oversight Here the investigation probabilities are constrained to depend only on whether the
agent complains or not. If the consumer complains, an error of denial must have been made (as





If the consumer does not complain, this is either because (i) the agent recommended a = 0 and was
right or (ii) she recommended a = 1. The decision is overturned only if the consumer was given









These are the ex post optimal levels of intervention that maximize social welfare. Note that oversight
is less precise here than with internal monitoring, as the external parties cannot distinguish within
the cases where no complaint was ﬁled. Thus, ρ∗∗(.,n) < ρ∗(1,n) above.
Eﬀort If the truth-telling condition is satisﬁed, the incentive of the agent is to maximize
Ua(v) =
[q(e) + (1 − q(e))ˆ ρ∗∗(0,c)](v + 1)
2
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Maximizing this expression yields the ﬁrst order condition for the agent’s eﬀort






q0(e)(1 − ˆ ρ∗∗(.,n))(1 − v)
2
+
∆q0(e))(1 + ˆ ρ∗∗(.,n))
2
= 1 (21)
For exactly the same reason as in Section 3, q(e) < q(e), so the principal has an incentive to choose
µ < z to improve incentives. Lemma 2 immediately follows.
27From an ex ante perspective, there is a probability
1
2 that either state occurred. Then there is a probability
q(e)
2
that the agent correctly allocated a = 0, and a probability
1
2 of a = 1, which is corrected with ex ante probaility
1−q(e)
2 . Summing these yields (18) as the probability of correction.
17Lemma 2 Assume that (5) holds, and that eﬀort is below the ﬁrst best level. Consider any equi-
librium where truth-telling holds. Then µ = 0.
This immediately follows from the fact that eﬀort is higher for v types than for v types. Since
with external oversight, monitoring probabities are independent of make-up of the sector, there
is no reason to hire v workers. This is one of the advantages of external oversight, namely, that
principal chooses only those agents who have better incentives as oversight decisions are made with
the objectives of society in mind and no longer depend on the make-up of the burueacracy.
4.1 Truth-telling
Yet these eﬀects only hold if truth-telling is not a problem. When the agent believes that the
consumer should be allocated the good, truth-telling is not a binding constraint (assuming (5)
holds) as the agent is both carrying out the optimal action and is minimizing the likelihood of a
complaint. Consider an equilibrium where αa = a. The problem arises when αa = 0 and the agent
should deny the beneﬁt to the consumer. If she denies the beneﬁt to the consumer, with probability
1 − q(e) she is incorrect and so will be the subject of a complaint. The complaint implies that the
agent was incorrect and so the expected wage of the agent is given by q(e)∆+(1−q(e))0 = q(e)∆.
By contrast, suppose that the agent now oﬀers the out-of-equilibrium allocation a = 1 to the
consumer. The consumer never complains, and investigations occur with probability ρ∗∗(.,n) above.
If an investigation occurs when the agent allocates a = 1, the agent is penalized if she was correct
and rewarded if her guess was incorrect, which occurs with probability 1 −q(e). Finally, the agent
earns a wage w0 if not investigated. In any equilibrium where truth-telling occurs, this arises either
because no complaint was made when allocating a = 0 or because the agent allocated a = 1. The
conditional probability of the agent being correct is
2q(e)
1+q(e) which exceeds q(e). In other words, not





Then the expected monetary return to oﬀering a = 0 is q(e)∆, while the monetary return to
misallocating a = 1 is ρ∗∗(1,n)[1 − q(e)]∆ + (1 − ρ∗∗(1,n))w0. Adding in the private beneﬁts for a
worker of type v yields that truth-telling only then arises if
q(e)(∆ + Si(0,0)) + (1 − q(e))[1 − ρ∗∗(0,c)]Si(0,1) + (1 − q(e))ρ∗∗(0,c)Si(1,1) ≥
(w0 + (1 − q(e))Si(0,1))[1 − ρ∗∗(.,n)] + (1 − q)ˆ ρ∗∗(.,n)∆ + (1 − q(e))Si(1,1). (23)
18This constraint is more easily satisﬁed for v employees, for two reasons. First, their private beneﬁts
from allocating a = 0 are higher than for the v workers. Thus the net eﬀect of private beneﬁts for
v agents is to relax the constraint. Second, these agents exert more eﬀort, and the truth-telling
constraint is relaxed as q increase. Since Lemma 2 illustrates that the principal would want v
workers anyway, I only need to consider the truth-telling condition for those workers.
Intuitively, truth-telling requires that the cost of a complaint to the agent not be large. If the
agent recommends that the consumer be denied, the agent’s ability is revealed only if the news is
bad. Alternatively, the agent can incorrectly allocate a = 1 in which case they face the prospect of
not being investigated (and getting a wage exceeding q(e)∆) or being investigated, in which case
they are likely penalized: only if they were wrong are they mistakenly perceived to be talented.
There is no necessary reason to expect the return from truth-telling to be higher. After some












There are two parts to the truth-telling condition. The term on the right hand side gives the private
beneﬁts from allocating a = 1 rather than a = 0. This is negative as v < 0. My interest is in the
left hand side, the monetary eﬀects of denying the beneﬁt to the agent. Proposition 2 illustrates
the importance of this condition.
Proposition 2 Assume that the truth-telling condition for the v agent is violated. Then the surplus
from internal monitoring (weakly) exceeds that of external monitoring.
But truth-telling need not hold. For example, consider the case where ∆ is large so that the
monetary consequences of actions are most important. Then as the cost of investigation (γ) gets
large, the left hand side of (24) is negative as ρ∗∗(1,n) → 0 as γ → ∞. Then for truth-telling to
hold, it must be that the likelihood of investigation when the consumer allocates the good to the
consumer is suﬃciently high. If the principal never oversees these cases, the agent always oﬀers
a = 1 as this would for sure increase his pay above the prior. It follows that there is a critical value
of γ above which truth-telling condition is a problem, and for ∆ large enough, internal monitoring
is used.
The incentives of police oﬃcers seem particularly apposite here. To guarantee that they deny
beneﬁts to suspects, it must be the case that their decisions are overseen reasonably frequently. But
in many cases, this is extremely diﬃcult. Consider this calculus for a police oﬃcer who is charged
with, say, arresting drug suspects. This involves identifying suspects and may involve searching,
19detention, and use of force. Sometimes these procedures backﬁre and a “suspect” is treated in a way
that can seem incompetent, malicious, or racist (New York Times, 2000a, 2000b). This can land
the oﬃcer in question in trouble. An alternative is simply to let suspects pass, thereby avoiding
the possible problems that arise with a false arrest or an accusation of assault. However, it may
be extremely hard to monitor those cases where the person was not arrested. Simply randomly
monitoring citizens will hardly be eﬃcient, as they are unlikely candidates. In terms of the model
above, γ is likely to be high, and so it may be very diﬃcult to give oﬃcers incentives to reveal
information credibly.
5 The Los Angeles Police Department
One way to test the ideas of this paper is by tracking how a change in oversight aﬀects the behavior
of a group of public oﬃcials. In this section, I consider the eﬀect of recent changes that have
increased the ability of consumers to complain against Los Angeles Police Department oﬃcers. The
increased oversight of oﬃcers was partly caused by well-publicized media accounts of infractions
by anti-gang squad oﬃcers during the mid-1990s.28 These concerns lead to the Rampart Board
of Inquiry, whose recommendations aﬀected the policies of the Department. One of these policies
was that the Department became more responsive after January 1998 to perceived infractions by
increasing the penalities that oﬃcers face for malfeasance. For example, all complaints against
oﬃcers are now investigated by the Internal Aﬀairs division of the police force.29 The result of
these investigations has often had disastous eﬀects on the careers of police oﬃcers. An implication
of the model above is that this is likely to result in oﬃcers avoiding actions that could lead to an
investigation, even when those actions are eﬃcient. (In the formal terms of the model, both ρ(0,c)
and ∆ have increased.)
In this section, I provide some exploratory evidence30 that oﬃcers are indeed avoiding such
confrontations. In summary, the changes appear to have caused less aggressive policing, which is
correlated with an enormous increase in the homicide rate over the last two years. Thus, as in the
model, increased external oversight may have backﬁred, by reducing the incentives for oﬃcers to
28Among these claimed infractions were the use of excessive force, framing suspects, and cocaine dealing.
29The Internal Aﬀairs division, rather unfortunately named, acts like external monitors in my model, as their
interest is largely induced by consumer complaints, and they tend to be poorly informed about cases unless they
respond to consumer complaints to investigate.
30One particular group in the police department, the anti-gang squad in Rampart, was the particular focus of the
department’s investigations, and resulted in a Board of Inquiry. In their report, they provide data on the procedures
and practices in Rampart and ﬁve other bureaus. The ﬁve other bureaus are Hollywood, Southeast, Van Nuys,
Wilshire and the 77th Street Area. The data in Figures 2 and 3 come from these six areas. Some of the data used
here are available at www.lapdonline.com.
20do their primary job, namely, confronting and arresting criminals.
The premise of the paper is that a primary mechanism for overseeing bureaucrats is through
its responsiveness to complaints (ρ(0,c) in the terminology of the model). Among the ﬁrst changes
implemented after the scandal were procedures that allowed the public to ﬁll out complaints on
line,31 and an order by the Chief of Police that every complaint against a police oﬃcer be forwarded
to the Internal Aﬀairs Division. As can be seen from Figure 1, the Department increased the fraction
of complaints that led to an investigation after 1998.
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Not surprisingly, this resulted in a huge increase in complaints.32 Data are not provided for all
years for the entire force, but the department notes that 5339 complaints were made against oﬃcers
(and civilian staﬀ) in 1998 and 5280 in 1999, up from 1912 in 1997, which itself was down from
a previous peak of 2359 in 1992.33 (There are approximately 10,000 oﬃcers in the L.A.P.D.) One
might imagine that this increase in complaints after 1998 would involve more marginal infractions
being brought forward than in prior years, where only the most serious problems would be worth
pursuing. If this was so, a lower fraction of these new complaints should ultimately be sustained
against the oﬃcer after the changes. Despite this, the fraction of complaints sustained (against
31See www.policeabuse.org, a website devoted to Police Complaints, for obstacles placed in the way of individuals
wishing to complain about an oﬃcer in other juristictions.
32In the model, the consumer always complains if he is denied the asset and the bureaucrat makes an error: thus,
the propensity to complain is independent of ρ(0,c). But this is an artifact of the assumption that complaints
are costless. In Prendergast, forthcoming, I allow consumers to have a non-trivial cost of complaint, where higher
responsiveness of the bureaucracy makes complaints more likely.
33Data are provided from 1994 to 1998 for the six areas covered by the Board of Inquiry. These data show a gradual
decline in complaints from 1994 to 1997, with a 108% increase in 1998.
21the oﬃcer) increased from 50% in 1997 to 53% in 1998, which suggests not only that consumer
complaints were now easier to ﬁle and investigate, but also that they were more likely to harm the
oﬃcer involved.
These changes have not been well received by the oﬃcers, who now perceive themselves more
at risk of suspension and losing their jobs. For example, between 1992 and 1997, an average of 13
oﬃcers per annum were removed from the force for malfeasance. In 1998, 55 oﬃcers were ﬁred,
with 44 ﬁred in 1999. Cannon (2000) argued recently that in total these changes have resulted in
over 800 oﬃcers being disciplined, 113 terminated, and many who have left the force rather than
be investigated. According to Tharp (2000), “more than 300 oﬃcers have either been forced out
or quit in the face of complaints”. Furthermore, in both 1998 and 1999, almost 5% of all oﬃcers
were suspended. Thus, it seems that the instruments used by this bureaucracy correspond closely
to those in the model: they can change their responsiveness to complaints, and the propensity to
ﬁre and suspend conditional on infractions after a case has been investigated. These are typical
career concern incentives.
The premise of the paper is that increased responsiveness to consumer complaints changes the
behavior of oﬃcers in ways that avoid consumer complaints (or worse, media attention). To use
the conclusion of a recent New York Times article, the upshot may be police oﬃcers who “too
often cruise down the street in the patrol cars - a practice known within the L.A.P.D. as drive and
wave - instead of engaging in aggressive policing” (Cannon, 2000, p. 62). There are a variety of
ways in which police behavior could change. First, oﬃcers may become more circumspect about
the use of force, where oﬃcers are now more likely to be disciplined for going beyond acceptable
levels of restraint. Yet such restraint is often necessary. Second, they may avoid confrontations
with individuals which could result in accusations of brutality. Third, they are likely to become
less likely to discharge their weapons, given accusations of oﬃcers shooting indiscriminately. (For
example, witness the recent riots in Cincinnati caused by the shooting of a black teenager, as in
New York Times, 2001.) Fourth, they may simply cut down on arrests, as suspects do not complain
when set free.34
I provide four pieces of information to suggest that police have become less aggressive in their
behavior: use-of-force data, oﬃcer-involved shootings, attacks on oﬃcers, and arrest rates.35 It is
34It is worth bearing in mind that in general there is no reason that increased oversight will result in less aggressive
policing. Increased oversight could, for instance, penalise an oﬃcer for failing to use force to subdue a suspect in
the same way as it could penalise him for using excessive force. But the premise of this paper is that because it is
consumers who raise ﬂags to point out malfeasance, oﬃcers will become more reticent in their dealings with suspects.
35It is important to note that these responses are not necessarily ineﬃcient. It could be that the objective of the
changes is to reduce “aggressive” policing: all that I argue here is that it appears that oﬃcers respond to the increased
oversight, and that there may be a price from this reaction.
22worth emphasizing at the outset that these data are time series averages so it is diﬃcult to devise
a precise test of incentives on behavior, especially as it took time for oﬃcers to realise the gravity
of the changes in oversight. However, I believe that the range of data oﬀered suggests a change in
the behavior of police oﬃcers towards suspects in the last three years. First, consider evidence on
formal use of force by oﬃcers in Figure 2.
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As can be seen above, the use of force per arrest fell by almost 20% in 1998, the year of the
change in policy.36 However, it is diﬃcult to claim that this was necessarily caused by the change
in oversight as there was a negative trend in the propensity to use force since 1994. While it may
be a response, the claim seem unproven.37 (Unfortunately, no data on use-of-force are available
after 1998.) Another measure provided in Figure 3 is the frequency of oﬃcer-involved shootings:
again, the paper predicts that increased oversight of oﬃcers will result in less shootings.38
36These data are for the six areas covered by the Rampart Board of Inquiry. For the department as a whole, the
reduction is lower, at 13%.
37It is not clear how to normalize use-of-force data. Here I normalize by incidents per arrest, but since arrests are
endogenous to the oversight process, this may be inappropriate. Another method is to use the number of incidents
of use-of-force per oﬃcer. This shows an 4% increase in incidents in 1997, and a 15% decline in 1998, which is more
suggestive of a response to the policy by oﬃcers.
38I have excluded shooting at animals and accidental discharges here.
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As can be seen from Figure 3, shootings declined in 1998 by 45%, which has remained in the
succeeding two years.39 These data suggest some response by police oﬃcers, but say little about
whether there is a price to pay for such reactions. Perhaps the most interesting and relevant
evidence comes from changes in gang activity in Los Angeles. After many years of decline, gang-
related violence in Los Angeles increased signiﬁcantly over the last two years: for instance, by
December, 2000, the homicide rate was 143% higher than at a comparable time the previous year,
and drive-by shootings up 69%.
The premise of the paper is that increased oversight will result in oﬃcers being less likely to
confront suspects. One measure which reﬂects the aggressiveness of policing is the number of
assaults on oﬃcers. If oﬃcers are more likely to engage in “drive and wave”, where they disengage
from troublesome situations, we would expect to see that assaults on oﬃcers have declined recently,
as less aggressive policing results in fewer confrontations. Notably, by December 2000, assaults on
police oﬃcers were down 35% from 1997. This may result in a higher crime rate if such aggressive
policing has a payoﬀ.40 Figure 4 provides recent data on this, where I compare homicide rates to
attacks on oﬃcers, from 1992 through the end of 2000. Both are normalized to 100 in the year
39In 1996, there was a change in department policy towards what is called bean-bag deployment, where bean-bag
rounds were ﬁred rather than live bullets. This factor increases the shooting numbers from 1996 to 1998: before
1996, these rounds were not used. When bean-bag incidents are excluded from the calculations, there was a decrease
of 15% in shootings from 1996 to 1997, and a reduction of 40% from 1997 to 1998, where the number of shootings in
1998 were only half its 1994 level.
40According to the New York Times (2000), the result of this policy is that “violent crime is up 9 percent this year
in poor neighborhoods after years of decline. Gang-related homicides are up 116 percent. Arrests and ﬁeld interviews
of suspected criminals are down” (p.62). To phrase this in the terminology of this paper, giving the customer what
they want looks like an increasingly popular strategy to oﬃcers faced with this increased responsiveness to complaints.
24preceding the change, 1997.
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Homicides
Attacks on Officers
These data suggest a negative relationship between attacks on oﬃcers and gang-related homicide
rates. Until 1998, gang related homicides fell as attacks on oﬃcers rose. However, after the change
in oversight in 1998, assaults on oﬃcers have declined while the homicide rate has soared to a
rate not seen since the mid-1990s. These trends have continued through the ﬁrst 4 months of
2001, where gang homicide rates are a further 100% higher than for the same period in 2000, while
attacks on oﬃcers are down a further 2.6% from 2000. One interpretation of this is that since 1998
oﬃcers have been responding to increased oversight by actions which, although keeping them out
of trouble, also result in higher crime.41
In the interests of completeness, I also provide econometric estimates of the time series correla-
tion between gang-related homicides and attacks on oﬃcers, using monthly gang data from March
1998 to April 2001. (The relevant gang related statistics are not available on a monthly basis
before March 1998.) As there is likely some lag between the policies of oﬃcers and the response
of gang members, I estimate the homicide rate in a given month with (i) assaults on oﬃcers in
the contemporaneous month, (ii) assaults on oﬃcers in the previous two months, and (iii) month
dummies, where the ﬁnal term picks up seasonality eﬀects in the homicide rate. The estimated
OLS regression is given in Table 1.
41There is obviously the possibility of unobserved heterogeneity generating this correlation. Yet most unobserved
heterogeneity that I can think of is likely to cause positive correlation between the two measures. For instance, an
unobserved shift in the returns to crime will both likely increase the crime rate and the confrontations that oﬃcers
have with criminals, thus generating a positive relationship. There is also an important issue of causality here: it
could be that oﬃcers simply avoid confronting gang members when homicide rates are high.
25Table 1: Estimating the Monthly Homicide Rate.
H(t) Constant Dummies OA(t) OA(t-1) OA(t-2)
Coeﬃcient 39.90 - -0.876 -0.417 -0.886
T-statistics (6.18) - (-3.14) (-1.35) (-2.8)
where H refers to the gang homicide rate, OA is the number of attacks on oﬃcers, and t is the
month. The t-statistics are provided below the estimates. The R-squared is 0.59 and N = 35.42
The signiﬁcant estimates illustrate that the negative correlation evident in Figure 4 continue to
hold in the monthly data for the post 1997 period.
It is also worth pointing out that in general, the available measures of gang crime are positively
correlated with each other. For instance, the gang-related aggravated assault rate has a correlation
coeﬃcient of +0.64 with the homicide rate. This should not be surprising as there are likely factors
that shift the demand for many types of crime. But this correlation is not true for these measures of
crime and the level of attacks on oﬃcers; both the assault rate and the homicide rate are negatively
correlated with the contemporaneous level of Attacks on Oﬃcers (the contemporaneous correlation
coeﬃcients are -0.04 and -0.37 respectively). Thus the factors causing attacks on oﬃcers seems to
be diﬀerent than for other measures of gang activity.
Finally consider the arrest record of oﬃcers. The central premise of the paper is that suspects
are more likely to be released when oversight increases. Figure 5 plots the ratio of arrests to crimes
for the more serious Part 143 crimes from 1996 through September 8, 2001.44
42None of the month dummies are signiﬁcantly diﬀerent from zero: there is little seasonality in homicides.
43Part 1 crimes consist of homicide, rape, robbery, aggravated assault, burglary, larceny, and auto theft.
44An alternative is simply to plot the total number of Part 1 arrests. These data are 42,800 (1996), 41,900 (1997),
40,700 (1998), 37,300 (1999), 33,700 (2000) and an annualized estimate of 31,300 for 2001 (the number of arrests
until September 8 was 17949, compared to 18379 at a comparable point in 2000). These raw data would suggest a
faster response (in 1998) to the increased oversight than in Figure 5.
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As can be seen, the steadily rising arrest rate of the Los Angeles Police department was abruptly
halted in the last two years, with a 15.3% decline in arrest rates between 1999 and 2000, and a
further decline in 2001. These changes coincide with the point when the changed disciplinary
measures began to have eﬀect.45 These data concern arrests for all Part 1 oﬀences, which are
considered the most serious oﬀences. However, the majority of these are made up of larceny, auto
theft, and burglary, which are less serious than homicide, rape, or aggravated assault. In Appendix
2, I decompose these crimes into their constituent parts, where I show that there has been a decline
in arrests per crime after 1998 for all of these categories except auto theft, where there appears to
be little change. Thus, there is no evidence that the change in oﬃcer behavior is focused on the
less serious oﬀences.
If police oﬃcers change their behavior to avoid attention, they are especially likely to do so
in cases where the victims of crime are diﬀuse, and are unlikely to complain about a particular
oﬃcer’s actions. One instance where this is likely to arise is failure to solve narcotics crimes, where
the victims are often unaware of the actions of the oﬃcer. The time series of narcotics arrests is
given in Figure 6, where I obviously do not normalize by total crimes here, as this is unknown. (It
45There is two potentially important problems with the 2001 data. First, many of the most recent crimes have
not been solved, as not enough time has elapsed to do so. This reduces the estimate for 2001 for reasons other
than increased oversight. To address this, I compared the data up to September 8, 2001, with equivalent data up to
September 8, 2000. At an equivalent point in time in 2000, the arrest per crime rate was 0.178 (compared to the end
of year arrest rate of 0.188) suggesting that the data for 2001 are underpresented by approxiately 0.01 or thereabouts.
This adjustment would not change the outcome in any qualitative way. Second, there are seasonality concerns to
worry about, as some crimes may be more common at some points of the year. There are two reasons to suggest that
this is not a major concern. First, there is little seasonality in Part 1 crimes in Los Angeles. See the 1999 and 1998
crime digests at www.lapdonline.com for more details. Second, this would only be a concern if the arrest/crime ratio
varies considerably across the year, which seems less likely than the crime rate itself.
27is precisely the fact that these crimes often go unreported that causes the agency problem here.)
The number of narcotics arrests shows a signiﬁcant fall in arrests over the last two to three years,
once again suggesting a change in how policing is carried out after the changes in oversight.
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To conclude, it is important to point out that these data cannot be used to claim that the
change in oversight was necessarily bad. Indeed, as there is no measure of police performance that
all can agree upon, some likely see the changes as beneﬁcial and others see it as a regressive step.
The purpose of this section has simply been to point out that the changes in oversight have had a
cost, in this case through reductions in the kind of aggressive policing that is often credited with
reducing crime in Los Angeles during the 1990s. While most probably realised that these changes
would have some restraining eﬀect on oﬃcers, the data here suggest that the behavioral responses
are large. For example, narcotics arrests were down almost 40% between 1998 and 2000, and down
further this year. As such, this section sounds a warning note to those who believe that the way
to resolve public sector ineﬃciencies is simply through more external oversight.
6 Extensions
6.1 Prices
So far, I have alluded to the agents above as public sector employees but have not described in any
detail why the kind of activities carried out in the private sector is likely to diﬀer. One important
distinction that often arises between the public and private sectors is the more limited role for
28purchasing beneﬁts in the public sector. For instance, citizenship is not for sale, but the services of
a (private sector) optician are. More generally, the typical transaction in the private sector involves
payments from consumers. In this section, I brieﬂy describe how this aﬀects the results above.
Remember that the consumer’s utility from the allocation is given by V (A,α) where V (1,α) >
V (0,α). But suppose that the utility function of a consumer is V (A,α)−pA, so that the allocation
of the good costs the consumer p and is separable. Furthermore, consider the case where there
exists a price p such that
V (1,1) − p > V (1,0) (25)
and
V (1,0) − p < V (0,0). (26)
In the private sector example above, a patient goes to an optician, unsure if he needs spectacles.
If the optician gives him glasses that he does not need, he is out of pocket by p for little beneﬁt.
But if he truly needs the glasses, his utility increases. If these conditions holds, then the principal
can use prices to attain a better allocation than is achieved above.46 To see this, assume that the
principal choose a price such that (25) and (26) hold. This has one important change from the
previous model, in that now the consumer complains if given the wrong allocation both when a = 1
and when a = 0.47 Thus, the patient complains about the optician if either (i) he receives glasses
he does not need, or (ii) he does not receive glasses that he needs. In the previous section, not
paying for the good meant that no complaints were registered when he received the good. This
changes the outcome in the following way.
Proposition 3 Assume that at µ = z, the agent’s eﬀorts e are below the ﬁrst best level. Then if
the principal can charge consumers a price p that satisﬁes (25) and (26), there is no reason to bias
hiring. Furthermore, e = e.
Proposition 3 implies that when consumers can be charged for goods in such a way as to make
their responses more informative of error, there is no longer any need to bias the make-up of the
workforce to induce eﬀort exertion.48 The idea that prices can be used to induce credible feedback
46Ex ante transfers can additionally guarantee that consumers pay 0 on average if this is desired.
47For example, consider the diﬀerence between a police force and a private security ﬁrm, who are deciding on
manning for a project. If a police force assigns too many oﬃcers for the security detail, the consumer does not
voice any concerns, as he does not pay for this. On the other hand, a private security ﬁrm charges for manpower at
competitive rates, and is likely to upset the customer if he suggests a large number of oﬃcers.
48The starkness of the result that bias disappears when prices can be charged arises from the assumption that states
0 and 1 are equally likely. Changing this assumption will cause bias even when consumer feedback is credible. This is
because the principal cares more about one state than another (as it is more likely to occur) and will select workers
29has been previously considered in Prendergast, 2001: the issue of interest here is how that aﬀects
the selection of agents. As the model is speciﬁed, the principal would be indiﬀerent between internal
and external monitoring (as they have identical cost functions) but nevertheless it is clear that there
is no need for bias in the selection of workers to induce eﬀort exertion. As a result, it is the fact
that consumers do not pay for assets, a central characteristic of the public sector, that generates
this result.
Again, it is worth emphasizing here that this paper says nothing about whether an activity
should be carried out in the public or private sector. Instead, all that this section says is that if
prices can be charged for an activity, it may be possible to alleviate the agency concerns. It should
be clear that there are many private sector examples which ﬁnd it diﬃcult to induce credible
consumer responses. Those involving insurance are one case where it may not be eﬃcient to
require consumers to pay for beneﬁts, as the cost of the monetary transfers are not separable from
the allocation. As a result, it may not be eﬃcient to require patients to pay to be approved for
medical procedures if it violates the insurance purpose of these programs. There are also many
private sector examples involving incentives where payments are unlikely to be a plausible way of
inducing consumers to self-select. For example, it should matter to our students whether they pass
our exams: it is highly unlikely that transfers can be used to induce students to self-select their
grades, or workers to self-select their promotions.
Ultimately, the issue addressed here is whether there exists some known allocation which is
ineﬃcient, yet which reduces the number of complaints made by consumers? If agents know of such
allocations, the problems outlined here exist. While there are private sector examples that satisfy
this condition, the fact that consumers do not pay for most public sector beneﬁts makes this the
most obvious place to observe this kind of behavior.
6.2 Informational Assumptions
It is simplistic to assume that, without formal investigation, internal monitors always observe
proposed treatments and that external monitors never do. Insiders sometimes know little. For
example, a police chief often will have no idea about unarrested suspects, or a superior of a custom’s
oﬃcial may have little idea about potential smugglers. On the other hand, there are cases where
external monitors observe more than is allowed here, for example when the police fail to arrest a
suspect in a well known case. As such, I make no claim that all internal and external oversight
who are most likely to ﬁnd errors in these states costly. Therefore, if it is more common to turn down applicants for
unemployment beneﬁts more than it is to accept them, the principal will ﬁnd this an additional reason to hire agents
sceptical of the consumer’s claims, and vice versa.
30takes the form above. Instead, the objective of the modeling sections is to illustrate that in many
instances, insiders are better informed about the cases where beneﬁts were given to consumers than
when institutions like the media or congress are used to investigate. The importance of the paper’s
distinction between internal and external monitoring then depends on the empirical diﬀerences in
their ability to observe details of cases.
Another important assumption is not only that internal overseers have the ability to observe
cases where consumers were denied beneﬁts, but also that they have the instruments to reward
agents for correctly doing so. But many overseers simply do not have the discretion to do so,
whether for legal reasons or otherwise. For example, in many public agencies the only way to oﬀer
incentives is through the threat of ﬁring, which is only carried out for gross violations of acceptable
performance. In eﬀect, there are few carrots for unusually good behavior. In those instances, truth-
telling is likely to be a serious problem, even when overseers can observe cases where the agent
correctly made the diﬃcult decision to deny beneﬁts: while the overseer can see that the agent has
made the correct decision, there is no way to reward her for doing so. Thus, the outcomes here rely
not only on the ability to observe behavior but also to reward bureaucrats for acting appropriately.
It is also unrealistic to claim that internal monitoring of public agencies reﬂects only the pref-
erences of the rank and ﬁle. There is surely some ability for superiors to impose oversight which
sometimes upsets the bureaucrats who are making the relevant decisions. As such, this paper oﬀers
an insight into why internal overseers of public bureaucracies are likely to have a very diﬃcult job;
their subordinates likely have preferences which place them at odds with external consituencies,
whose objectives these superiors are employed to implement. But equally it is naive to think that
internal monitoring does not reﬂect the preferences of the employees. First, many bosses are pro-
moted internally, and are likely to reﬂect the preferences of insiders. Second, much of the relevant
information on malfeasance is not spotted by superiors, but by co-workers, who must be relied
upon to pass on relevant details. As such, the biases of bureaucrats is likely to be reﬂected in the
way that internal oversight operates.
6.3 Limited Private Beneﬁts
Bias by bureaucrats played two roles in the model above. First, it changed the incentives of the
bureaucrats to exert eﬀort. Second, it harmed oversight by intervening in ways diﬀerent to the
preferences of society. There is a ﬁnal way eﬀect of bias in that it can cause agents to allocate
beneﬁts based on private rather than social surplus. For example, an immigration oﬃcial who gets
private beneﬁts from denying applicants entry may do so even when the applicants are qualiﬁed.
31This eﬀect has been ignored in the model by the assumption of limited private beneﬁts: they were
assumed small enough that they never overcome the desire to allocate honestly.
A more general model would relax this, perhaps by allowing outcomes to be continuous, rather
than the binary outcomes here. In this way, there may be some marginal cases where society would
like a consumer to be treated in one way, but the agents instead treats the person according to the
agent’s private beneﬁts. For example, some arrests would be made that society would set free. Yet
this generalization is unlikely to change the message of the paper, namely, that some bias in the
composition of bureaucrats is likely to be beneﬁcial. The idea behind the results above is simply
that distortions are traded oﬀ against one another when choosing the make-up of the bureaucracy.
While this extension will add one more distortion, the qualitative eﬀects of biasing hiring will likely
remain. If so, problems of internal oversight once again arise. While the degree to which agents
will be biased will be tempered by this additional cost, there will remain the tendency to hire
bureaucrats sceptical of the merits of the consumers case, and so the diﬃculty of using insider
oversight is likely to remain.
7 Conclusion
Agency theory is concerned with understanding the constraints that limit the eﬃciency of institu-
tions. One might imagine that agency theory would then focus on those institutions which seem
least eﬃcient, government bureaucracies being a prime candidate. Yet ironically the vast majority
of agency work has been on occupations and institutions where these problems are least likely to
be observed, such as executives in Fortune 500 companies, salesforce workers, and sharecropping
farmers. See Prendergast, 1999, Malcomson, 1999, and Gibbons and Waldman, 1999, for details.
The upshot of this is that by now we have a relatively good understanding of the role of pay-for-
performance contracts and monitoring for workers whose objectives are easy to specify and monitor.
Yet we have learned little about what motivates public sector bureaucrats such as police oﬃcers,
beneﬁt oﬃcials, doctors (in many countries), army oﬃcers, teachers, tax collectors, immigration
oﬃcials, and so on. Much of what goes on in these occupations remains murky, despite the fact
that in many countries they are a majority of the workforce. The purpose of this paper has been to
formally address the environment in which bureaucrats operate to generate a better understanding
of (i) how bureaucrats are selected, and (ii) how their performance is overseen.
The ultimate message of the paper is that it is futile to expect the solutions typically used in
the literature to be as eﬀective for the allocation of beneﬁts, because bureaucrats are inherently
harder to monitor. Agency concerns largely arise because it is diﬃcult to monitor workers, and so
32consumers are used to point out errors. But consumers are less reliable for many of the activities of
the public sector, because so many of the goods given out in the public sector are free. As a result,
more costly mechanisms of both providing incentives and overseeing performance are needed. In
this paper, this took the form of hiring bureaucrats who are dubious about the merits of consumer
claims, and of being left with the diﬃcult choice of relying on them to oversee (though they are
biased) or using less informed outsiders, where bureaucrats can change their actions to stay out of
the limelight, as illustrated by the police data.
33Appendix 1: Proofs of Results
Proof of Lemma 1:
A suﬃcient condition for Lemma 1 is that the private beneﬁts from misallocation are negative.
The relative private beneﬁt from allocating a = 0 rather than a = 1 when αa = 0 is given by
q(e)Si(0,0) + (1 − q(e))ρ∗(0,c)Si(1,1) ≥
(1 − q(e))Si(1,1) + q(e)[1 − ρ∗(1,n)]Si(1,0) + q(e))ρ∗(1,n)Si(1,1). (27)
Substituting yields
q(e)+(1−q(e))ρ∗∗(0,c)(1+v) ≥ (1−q(e))(1+v)+q(e)[1−ρ∗(1,n)]v +q(e)ρ∗(1,n)(1+v). (28)
For an allocation of a = 0, this constraint can only be violated for type v. However, simple manip-
ulations shows that this condition is always satisﬁed if (5) holds.
The relative private beneﬁt from allocating a = 1 rather than a = 0 when αa = 1 is given by
q(e)Si(1,1) + (1 − q(e))ρ∗(1,n)Si(0,0) + (1 − q(e))[1 − ρ∗(1,n)]Si(1,0) ≥
(1 − q(e))Si(0,0) + q(e))ρ∗(0,c)Si(1,1). (29)
Substituting yields
q(e)(1 + v) + (1 − q(e))ρ∗∗(1,n) + (1 − q(e))[1 − ρ∗(1,n)]v ≥ (1 − q(e)) + q(e)ρ∗(0,c)(1 + v). (30)
For an allocation of a = 1, this constraint can only be violated for type v. However, simple manip-
ulations shows that this condition is always satisﬁed if (5) holds.
Proof of Proposition 1:
First, if ρ(.,c) > ρ(.,n), the consumer only complains if a = 0 and the agent is incorrect in
any Bayesian Nash equilibrium. Second, given this, Bayes Law requires that oversight is given by
(9), (10), and (11). With these oversight probabilities, and the assumption that a given worker does
not update on µ from the fact that he was hired, eﬀort decisions must then be given by (12). By
the assumption in footnote 17, their beliefs are tied down by the equilibrium choice of the principal
on the assumption that the principal’s action does not change the perception of µ. The objective
of the principal is that to maximize (16) subject to (9), (10), (11), and (12). Straightforward
34diﬀerentiation of (16) with respect to µ yields
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From (13), (14), and (15), it should be clear that q(e) < q(e). For q(e) below the ﬁrst best level
speciﬁed in footnote 22, this implies that surplus is higher from the eﬀort of the v agent. Therefore,




















Consequently, the ﬁrst order condition for equilibrium requires that
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or µ < z.
Proof of Proposition 2:
If truth-telling does not holds, there exists no equilibrium where the agent can be induced to reveal
αa = a. Instead, there are two possible pure strategy Bayesian Nash equilibria of the model: (i)
where a = 0 is always recommended, and where a = 1 is always recommended. (These equilibria
can be supported by oﬀering w = ∆q(E(e)) if the agent deviates.) In these equilibria, the agent
is rewarded with a wage w = ∆q(E(e)), where E(e) is the expected level of eﬀort exerted by the
agent. But since w = ∆q(E(e)) is independent of true eﬀort, this implies that e = E(e) = 0.
But an equilibrium where the agent recommends a independent of his information and exerts
e = 0 is at least weakly dominated by internal monitoring where µ = z. In that case, there is
an equilibrium where the agent allocates a = αa, and exerts eﬀort e > 0. If that equiibrium
has a payoﬀ which dominates oﬀering a = 0 or a = 1 with probability 1, then internal monitor-
ing is strictly better. Otherwise, there exists an equilibrium with internal monitoring where the
same strategies are followed as in the external case posited here, and hence the payoﬀs are equal.
Thus, if truth-telling is violated, internal monitoring at least weakly dominates external monitoring.
Proof of Proposition 3:
Consider ﬁrst the role of internal monitoring.
The Incentive to Complain If the principal chooses p to satisfy (25) and (26), the agent
complains both when an error is made by recommending a = 0 and a = 1, if complaints increase
35oversight, as assumed.
Oversight If the agent always complains when an error has been made, the overseer chooses
ρ∗∗∗(0,c) =








ρ∗∗∗(.,n) = 0. (36)
Truth-Telling Assumption (5) guarantees truth-telling as in Proposition 1.
Eﬀort Eﬀort is chosen to maximize
Ua(v) =
[q(e) + (1 − q(e))ρ∗∗∗(0,c)](v + 1)
2









+ q(e)∆ − e (37)
Maximizing this expression yields the ﬁrst order condition for the agent’s eﬀort
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2
+ ∆q0(e) = 1 (38)




Thus, unlike the previous model, selection has no eﬀect on incentives. As a result, e = e. But if this
is the case, the optimum is where µ = z as this maximizes oversight propensities. This implies that
the best internal monitoring outcome involves µ = z. But this is also the same optimal outcome
as with external monitoring (as e = e), and so the best outcome involves µ = z.
36Appendix 2: Arrest Rates by Crime






96 97 98 99 2000 2001
Homicide Arrests/Crime







96 97 98 99 2000 2001
Rape Arrests/Crime







96 97 98 99 2000 2001
Aggravated Assault Arrests/Crime






96 97 98 99 2000 2001
Robbery Arrests/Crime






96 97 98 99 2000 2001
Larceny Arrests/Crime






96 97 98 99 2000 2001
Auto Theft Arrests/Crime
38Appendix 3: The Assumption of Unobserved µ
Throughout the paper, I assumed that the agents could infer µ from the actions of the principal,
but did not observe it directly. The impact of this assumption is that the principal could not aﬀect
eﬀort for a given person through the choice of whom to hire. Instead, the eﬀect of hiring policies
were simply to overselect those who work harder. But allowing the agent to observe the fraction
of v workers to hire adds two additional eﬀects.
First, remember that incentives are muted by the fact that in some states (namely, those where
the agent gives the consumer the beneﬁt and there is no investigation), there is no information
revealed on the agent. This, not surprisingly, reduces incentives. But the principal can change
the likelihood of this state, by its hiring practices. In particular, increasing the fraction of scep-
tical agents (the v types) increases oversight propensities in this state (see (11)) and therefore
increases eﬀort. Consequently, another reason to increase the fraction of sceptical agents is to make
investigations more likely when the consumer does not complain, and so increase incentives.
Second, the premise of the paper is that the prospect of making errors (partly) drives the
incentives of the agents. But agents realise that the principal will step in to correct some errors.
This then gives the principal an incentive to commit not to correct errors, in the interest of inducing
more eﬀort, as the agent’s decisions then become more pivotal. But the principal cannot directly
commit: instead, oversight is carried out in a subgame perfect fashion. Yet he can commit in
an indirect fashion through hiring practices. For example, suppose that the principal chooses to
hire only v agents. Then the agent realises that oversight is likely very high when the agent is
denied the beneﬁt (as ρ∗(0,c) =
1+(1−z)(v−v)
γ ), but very low when the agent is given the beneﬁt
(as ρ∗(1,n) =
(1−q)[1+(z−1)(v−v)]
γ ). This reallocation of oversight propensities has an ambiguous
eﬀect on incentives, but could increase them. This implies that the selection of agents can have
an commitment-like eﬀect on oversight in such as way as to increase agent incentives. This is the
second eﬀect of observing µ on incentives.49
49I oﬀer these extensions not because of their empirical importance, where agents can observe the preferences of
their co-workers, and the principal can use this to his advantage in the ways outlines above. Instead, this section
simply addresses other eﬀects which would arise with diﬀerent modeling choices.
39References
Aghion, Philippe and Jean Tirole, “Formal and Real Authority in Organizations”, Journal of
Political Economy, 1997, 105, 1-29.
Cannon, Lou, “One Bad Cop”, New York Times, October 2, 2000, New York.
Dixit, Avinash, “Incentives and Organizations in the Public Sector: An Interpretive Review”,
mimeo, 2001.
Gibbons, Robert and Michael Waldman, “Careers in Organizations: Theory and Evidence”,
forthcoming, Handbook of Labor Economics, 1999.
Hall, Sarah, “Protests as Prague Airport Asylum Screening Resumes”, The Guardian, August
28, 2001.
New York Times, “Besmirched Deportland Wrestles With the INS”, August 31, 2000, New York.
New York Times, “Police in Cincinnati Pull Back in Wake of Riots”, July 19, 2001, New York.
Malcomson, James, “New Developments in the Study of Contracts in Labor Markets”, forth-
coming in Handbook of Labor Economics, 1999.
Prendergast, Canice, “The Provision of Incentives in Firms”, Journal of Economic Literature,
1999, 37, 7-63.
Prendergast, Canice, “The Limits of Bureaucratic Eﬃciency”, mimeo, 2001.
Prendergast, Canice, “Consumers and Agency Problems”, Dennis Sargan Lecture, Royal Eco-
nomic Society, 2001: forthcoming, Economic Journal.
Star Tribune, “Congressional Cures for the IRS Worse than Agency’s Ills”, August 30, 2000.
Tharp, Mike, “L.A.’s Go-to Guy Gets Down To Business”, U.S. News and World Report, 2000,
September 11.
Wilson, James, Bureaucracy, Basic Books, New York, 1989.
40